At the end of the Second World War, the American dominated “West”– NATO– ended up facing the Russian dominated Soviet Union– the Warsaw Pact. Everybody knows this– or should– and each side quickly realized that the post-war peace would be a tense one. Both sides re-armed and soon, both sides were trying to figure out exactly how a war between NATO and the Soviet Union would resolve itself. This long rivalry led to a strategic and technological shadowboxing, as each produced weapons, strategies and tactics that tried to anticipate this future war. The influence of the Cold War in military thinking today is– needless to say– incredibly profound.
First, it must be said that any future military showdown between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was predicated on the belief that it would largely resemble the Second World War, or that it would be a giant clash of combined arms machinery and a challenge of industrial and scientific might. It would be total war. The whole idea of “conventional” and “unconventional war” today really stems from this belief. Conventional war, post WW2, was a conflict that resembled the kind of combined arms slugfests of that conflict. By that token, “unconventional war” tended to be any other kind of war, with the irony being that “unconventional war” was by far more common in the post-war world than the “conventional” kind.
Second, nuclear weapons complicated everything. Nuclear weapons existed in both the supra-strategic field and in the tactical sphere, with a blur between the two. Basically, nukes could be aimed at cities and be used as weapons of megadeath and apocalypse– terror weapons designed to hold enemy populations hostage. However, some nukes were also designed to be used on the battlefield, as tactical projectiles to be aimed at enemy formations, depots, bridges, enemy shipping, and other “military” targets. The Americans at one point even had nuclear air-to-air missiles that they proposed to shoot at Russian bomber formations (ironically, this was intended to be a defense against nuclear attack). The line between tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons was probably going to be far more theoretical than real, but no matter how hazy, a distinction was there.
The Russians are coming!
With that being said, the two sides built their military power and doctrine on the elements that helped them win the Second World War. In Russia’s case, what enabled Russia to finally defeat Germany was its effective implementation of “Deep Operation” or “Deep Battle” doctrine that had been formulated prior to the war. Again, I’ve harped on it numerous times on this blog, but the Russians independently developed their own idea of mobile, mechanized operations rather like the German “blitzkrieg.” The goal of these “deep operations” is NOT to slug it out in attrition-style World War I battles, but to use deception and surprise and mechanized forces to first find a weak point in the enemy line, punch through, and then pour tanks through it to fan out into the enemy rear, wreak havoc with supply lines, communication systems and generally cut off and isolate frontline defenses and destroy an enemy army’s coherence. This kind of warfare stressed mobility, momentum and good planning.
“Deep operations” fit in well with Russian strengths and weaknesses. The large, open plains of Russia tend to favor mobile and maneuver warfare and to make static defenses a little harder to sustain unless you know where to put them. The Russians also had to contend with large conscript armies that weren’t always very technically proficient, or would be difficult to train to Western levels due to cost and practicality considerations. This made centralized planning attractive, it helped to compensate for less trained soldiers with less initiative. It also fit in well with Soviet ideas of centralized planning and control. Russian soldiers weren’t robots, they were given some freedom of choice, but they weren’t given the same broad freedom of action as Western soldiers– a Russian had a “menu” of choices to choose from whenever confronted with a situation. This even applied to the field of logistics– Russians used a “push” style of logistics. Instead of the Western “pull” style which relies on requisitions from a unit, the Russians will simply periodically send pre-planned packages of supplies, containing previously calculated amounts of ammunition, fuel, spares and food. This again emphasizes centralized planning and helps keep up the momentum of an attack. Finally, “deep operations” also relied heavily on mechanized warfare– on tanks and trucks and artillery. These were things that fit in well with Soviet notions of heavy industry as a key to modernization, they were easily standardized and mass produced, and they were also effective weapons that weren’t quite as technologically and logistically demanding as sophisticated combat aircraft or ships.
To put it simply, the Russian army of the Cold War– really from beginning to end– was a tank army. It was built around the tank, it was keyed to the pace of the tank and the centerpiece of operations was the tank. Russians would use combined arms forces to punch a hole in NATO lines and then the Russian tanks would race around the rear, destroying NATO rear lines. This was primarily a weapon of offense, and one thing I do note about a lot of the Cold War literature is that there is an implicit assumption that the Russians will be doing the attacking.
The Russian concern for mechanization influenced every aspect of its training and equippage. Russia became perhaps the most heavily mechanized army of the Cold War. Everybody rode on something. A good example is the Russian Airborne Troopers, or the VDV. Airborne troops have traditionally been light infantry– once they’ve disembarked from their airplanes or their helicopters they tend to be light leg infantry with few vehicles and light weaponry. The Russians had other ideas– their airborne corps was fully mechanized. Their airborne troops had airborne counterparts of the BMP-1, for instance, in the form of the BMD-1. They also had fully mechanized fire-support vehicles, like the ASU-85 or the later 2S9 Nona.
The BMD-1, "Boyevaya Mashina Desanta."
Operationally, the Russian airborne had a similar mission to Western airborne– operations behind the frontline. However, the Russians mechanized theirs to enable them much greater mobility, thereby making them more effective in the Deep Operation doctrine of wreaking havoc in the enemy rear. It also made them tougher and more effective in a fight by the simple virtue of having armor and fire support. Finally, with later modifications to their vehicles, it made them more survivable in a nuclear environment.
The VDV isn’t the only example of Russian commitment to mechanization and armored warfare. Perhaps even better and more dramatic was the creation of the BMP, or the “Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty” which was history’s first Infantry Fighting Vehicle, or IFV.
Up to that point, the mechanized transporters of infantry tended to be soft-skinned trucks, which were vulnerable to enemy fire and of limited use outside roads, or in armored personnel carriers, APCs, which tended to be battle-taxis, used to bring soldiers up to the front line (with protection from artillery fragments) whereupon their passengers debarked and fought on foot.
The Russians found this to be inadequate with their Deep Operations doctrine with the increasing lethality of the modern battlefield. What especially worried the Russians was the prospect of having to provide infantry support to their tanks (which is crucial) in a hostile NBC or Nuclear, Biological and Chemical environment. The solution they hit on was to create a vehicle from inside which the infantry could fight, and which was armed and mobile enough to be useful in an armored advance. So the BMP was built to provide NBC protection, with fire ports for the infantrymen’s rifles, and it was given a gun and missile system with which to engage enemy armor. It was also given enough mobility to accompany the current Russian tanks– the T-62 and T-64. It was not heavily armored since it was not expected to bear the brunt of enemy fire. Eventually, it was found that firing a rifle from inside a moving vehicle with limited visibility was not feasible, and that the firing ports compromised the BMP-1′s armor, so these were abandoned. The concept of the IFV remained, however. Today every major power operates IFVs for their mechanized infantry.
The tank, however, was the main vehicle and weapon of the Russian army. They were a tank power and still largely are. Russian tanks were designed around the concept of Deep Operations– they are fast, reliable, well armored and well-armed. Initially, less concern was given to firing on the move and sophisticated gunsights since doctrine specified they attack in waves, firing unaimed shots on the move to confuse the enemy. They were also built to have a low profile, with thick frontal armor to present a more difficult target from the front– Russian tanks made considerable sacrifices in crew comfort and post-penetration survivability in order to keep their small sizes. Since Deep Operations demanded LOTS of tanks, Russian tanks were also somewhat simpler and cheaper than their Western counterparts. They were also easier to maintain and extremely rugged. When it comes to tanks, the Russians know their shit. It was these tanks that Russia planned to overwhelm NATO, pouring out of the Russian steppe and defeating the West in armored battles in Germany– precisely what happened in World War Two.
There has been some misconception that Russian tanks were qualitatively inferior to NATO tanks. I find this premise to be flawed– Russian tanks probably maintained at least parity with NATO tanks– up until the mid-80s. The T-55, for instance, was at least equal to its contemporary, the American M-47 and M-48 Patton, possibly even better. However, this quality disparity may have shifted in NATO’s favor in the mid-80s with the new generation of NATO tanks like the Challenger, Leopard 2 and Abrams.
Mors Ab Alto
NATO– America– emerged from World War 2 with a very different kind of strength: America had an extremely effective and powerful air force, and it was this arm to which they devoted most of their scientific and industrial energies in World War 2. Air power fit in well with American society and culture: they were high-technology weapons that made good use of American scientific and industrial power by being able to inflict disproportionate damage to their numbers. Aircraft could also theoretically overfly enemy defenses and destroy, demoralize or simply render enemy armies ineffective without the need for a large army. During the Cold War, an air force was doubly attractive because it promised to cut down on friendly casualties and it also maximized the NATO strength in nuclear weapons.
Americans therefore built and trained a large, effective air force in the post war period. They emphasized sophistication and technology and– a rarity– they also built long-range strategic bombers. While they may have built some of their successes on German experiments, it was really the Americans who pioneered or made wide-scale use of such air-to-air technology as supersonic flight, air-to-air refueling, air-to-air missiles and other such refinements. Much of American Cold War doctrine was built around fighting for and securing air superiority– if not supremacy– and then bombing the living hell out of the enemy.
NATO did have ground forces, of course, but the centerpiece remained the air force. One complaint voiced in the ’70s (which led to the AirLand War doctrine) was that ground forces were too passive, trained mainly to find the enemy and then call down fire support. This isn’t fair– Americans practiced sophisticated maneuver warfare in Korea and World War 2 even without having an official doctrine on it– but it is true that a disproportionate amount of American focus was given to its air planes. American tanks, artillery and APCs were probably only adequate or good during most of the Cold War, while its airplanes were some of the world’s best.
Americans also developed a sophisticated air doctrine for its use– they would wage a comprehensive air campaign against the Russians. Russian air power tended to be tactical– focused on winning local air superiority over a specific battlefield and supporting ground troops. There were “counters” in the Russian air mission or aircraft deliberately designed to counter a specific American strength– Tu-22M Backfires designed to overwhelm American carrier groups with anti-ship missiles, for instance– and they had strategic bombers. But Russians didn’t have the kind of multi-layered air power the Americans had. Americans had aircraft for air superiority missions, they had interceptors for bomber defense, they had tactical bombers over the battlefield, strike fighters for battlefield interdiction and strategic bombers for long range bombardment. They also created a whole suite of support aircraft, like tankers, AWACS and so on.
There were never doctrines as carefully worked out and integrated as the Russian commitment to Deep Operations, but in a potential World War 3 with Russia America would have unleashed its air armada on the Soviets. The Russians would have been hard pressed to stop this– strategic bombers would have been hitting their cities, marshalling yards, oil facilities and other deep rear assets while more tactical air power would have been hitting bridges, railroads, supply depots and columns, HQs and other BAI targets. At the very front, tactical air power would have been attacking Russian ground forces directly, although there was some complaint in the late ’70s and early ’80s that the USAF wasn’t taking this mission seriously. Above it all, the Americans would have theoretically tried to erect an umbrella of fighters and tried to gain air superiority, thus denying the enemy the ability to operate its own air force with much efficiency. The implications of air superiority go beyond combat– the force with air superiority can operate its recon aircraft, transports and other ancillaries with much more ease, giving it that much more of an advantage in a war. As Erwin Rommel said of trying to fight an enemy with air superiority: it’s like a savage trying to fight a European army with modern arms, and with about as much chance of success.
The Phabulous Phantom
An excellent example of American sophistication in the field of military aviation is the F-4 Phantom. The F-4 Phantom was a multi-role aircraft designed first to intercept enemy fighters for the Navy and then adapted as an interceptor and strike fighter for the air force. Eventually, it would become a creditable dogfighter, an anti-enemy air defense platform and a reconnaissance aircraft along with the bombing and interception mission. The Phantom could fulfill many roles, and it could do this because of its advanced (for its time) electronics and design. It was found that the electronics weren’t as advanced as was claimed– the Phantom had no internal gun, for instance, and it was found that its early missiles were unreliable– but it was improved consistently. The Phantom remained in service for over 30 years, only being retired from American service in the ’90s.
It's a love shack! The American B-52 bomber.
The B-52 Stratofortress is another good example of American Cold War air power. This aircraft was originally designed to be a high-flying nuclear bomber meant to penetrate Russian air space to drop nukes. In this role, it would have been able to haul the massive nuclear weapons then in service and it had the range to fly from American bases and back. It was also survivable, since it had (for its time) an extensive and sophisticated electronic warfare suite for self-defense. Eventually, it would be refitted to drop conventional bombs and was used to saturate enemy ground forces in Vietnam. The Arc Light missions were rightly feared by the Vietnamese and were extremely destructive. It might seem like overkill (and in retrospect, it was) but it shows the American commitment to airpower as a solution to its military problems.
The B-52 is such a good design that it is in service until today– 60 years since its introduction. Its “successors”– the B-1 and B-2– serve alongside it and it may even outlast them. Today, the B-52 still drops bombs conventionally, but it is also an aerial cruise missile launcher.
With this air power, America has projected its military muscle throughout the Cold War. Air power, strategic and tactical, were keys to American warfighting in Korea and Vietnam. Bombings and air strikes were used to intimidate Gaddafi during El Dorado Canyon in the ’80s. It was American Cold War-trained and equipped air power that destroyed the Iraqi Army in Desert Storm.
During the early parts of the Cold War, America also proposed on using its air force to maximize its advantage in nukes. Many of America’s 50′s era bombers were nuclear bombers, tactical or otherwise. The idea was that nukes would be used to stop the Russian advance and some of America’s more famous aircraft began life as pure nuke droppers, like the F-105 Thunderchief and the A-5 Vigilante. This is not counting the huge fleet of heavy bombers that America initially used to carry nukes. Eventually, nuclear delivery shifted to ballistic missiles– safer and more reliable– and there was a shift away from tactical nukes when strategists realized that they might lead to escalation. Escalation was more acceptable when NATO had a nuke advantage, but it became less so over time. NATO never gave up on tactical nukes, and into the ’80s, they would be used to help stop Russia (which would involve dropping nukes on Western Germany– an ally) but with an improvement in American ground power, this reliance on tactical nuclear weapons tended to decline.
Down with the capitalist pigs!
Die, Commie scum!
Either way, the main confrontation below the nuclear sphere was Russian armor against American air power. In many ways the two cancel each other out, and in many ways each is vulnerable to the other. Air power would be hard pressed to stop a massed attack of armor–tanks are very difficult targets–and air power is vulnerable to having its bases overrun. On the other hand, while attacking tanks from the air might not necessarily be destructive, it is disruptive and demoralizing and might slow the momentum of an assault. Even worse, mechanized armies rely on large, vulnerable supply columns for ammunition, spares and especially, fuel. These are wonderful targets for air attack and a tank army facing an air force faces the unhappy prospect of having their support services bombed to pieces, thereby rendering them helpless.
The two sides realized the situation they faced and NATO and the Soviets naturally tried to find means to counter the other’s strengths.
Russia, for instance, began to build more and more ground-based anti-aircraft systems, many of them mobile enough to keep pace with its mechanized forces. Over time, the Russians would come to possess thousands of anti-aircraft guns and missiles, all meant to knock NATO out of the sky. The picture above is a ZSU-23-4, a mobile, radar-aimed anti-aircraft vehicle that served to defend Russian tanks. It was joined by a host of missiles, from the early SA-2 that gave the Americans such trouble in Vietnam, to the SA-6 that nearly cost the Israelis the air war in ’73, to the SA-11s, SA-13s, SA-300s of today. NATO aircraft were faced with the daunting prospect of having to press home their strikes while facing this massive air defense umbrella. Russia had fighters, and reasonably good ones, but Russia seems to have realized that it couldn’t match NATO in the air with just fighters and therefore built up a massive air defense network.
NATO had to respond–America experienced the strength of Russian air defenses in Vietnam, and it saw the havoc wrought on the Israelis in ’73. America would go on to create the so-called Wild Weasel mission, which is specifically tasked with SEAD or Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses. The Wild Weasel aircraft essentially baits enemy radar into targeting it, whereupon it will attempt to destroy the radar with an anti-radiation missile like the AGM-88 HARM or even just an ordinary cluster bomb. Needless to say, this is a ridiculously dangerous job, hence the delightful motto of the Wild Weasel mission: “You’ve Got To Be Shitting Me.”
Going a step further, NATO had to adapt its air tactics. From high-flying, high speed aircraft like the F-105 Thunderchief or XB-70 Valkyerie, NATO had to shift to so-called NOE or Nap Of the Earth tactics, where aircraft fly as low to the ground as possible in hopes of going under enemy radar, using hills and mountains to mask their approach. The B-1 Lancer bomber is a good example of this evolution: it started life as a high speed, high-altitude bomber, but when it entered service it had been redesigned and was now optimized for the low-altitude strike role.
Finally, America tried to get around the whole problem of enemy air defenses entirely: it fielded “stealth” aircraft. Ironically, the principles of stealth were worked out by a Russian physicist, but it was the Americans who put this into practice, first with the so-called “Have Blue” demonstrator, then with the F-117 Nighthawk, the Stealth Fighter, to today’s F-35 Lightning II and F-22 Raptors.
In the same way that the Russians had to develop a plethora of anti-aircraft weapons, NATO would eventually devote a large part of its scientific expertise in coming up with anti-tank weapons. NATO would come to pin most of its hopes on the anti-tank missile. This weapon tended to use a HEAT warhead, or high-explosive anti-tank, which uses chemical energy rather than the brute force of kinetic energy that a solid armor-piercing shot uses. A HEAT warhead has an inverted cone of metal inside, surrounded by explosive. Upon hitting a target, the explosive detonates, melting the metal and projecting it forward at extremely high velocity. Contrary to the name, the stream of metal acts as a solid penetrator, and does not “melt” its way through armor. It is still a stream or jet of liquid, however, and this is important to remember.
One advantage of HEAT warheads is that they do not need to be shot from powerful guns. Instead, relatively low-velocity missiles and rockets can be used, which means that far more items can be equipped with effective anti-tank weapons. So the individual infantryman can be given a disposable anti-tank rocket launcher, a small jeep can be equipped with an effective anti-tank missile, or– as seen above– helicopters and aircraft can now be more reliably used against tanks. Tank busting is in fact notoriously difficult and in World War II, most aircraft were not very successful at it– but guided missiles with HEAT warheads promised to change this.
NATO also fielded other anti-tank weaponry and the battlefield was soon inundated with weapons dangerous to tanks. For instance, NATO made large-scale use of cluster munitions, which spray an area with small submunitions, thereby obviating the need for precision– difficult to achieve when trying to hit an armored, mobile target like a tank. Weapons like the MLRS rocket artillery system, or even ordinary howtizers like the M-1-09 were given shells that made it rain bomblets. NATO also focused heavily on more innovative systems like the SADARM– which combines artillery with explosively formed penetrators and smart weapons, and other devious and clever weapons.
Obviously, the West wasn’t the only country to use missiles and other such weapons for anti-tank duties. The first dramatic outing of the anti-tank missile was against Western equipment in the Yom Kippur War, after all. However, it was Russia that stood to suffer the most from this. Enough anti-tank weapons in NATO hands could completely defeat the Deep Operation stress on momentum and mobility. So Russia had to extensively update its tanks to account for this threat.
For every action, a reaction.
One way that Russia did so was by coating its tanks with so-called reactive armor. Instead of designing new tanks with expensive and difficult to manufacture composite armor like Chobham, Russia decided to improve existing tanks instead. Reactive armor is basically a brick filled with explosives with a metal face. Upon being hit by a HEAT warhead, the explosive detonates, propelling the steel face into the path of the HEAT warhead’s particle stream and either deflecting it away or weakening it. Nowadays, it’s become an almost signature feature of Russian tanks to be covered with reactive armor and Russia also claims that their reactive armor can defend against solid kinetic penetrators as well.
Iron Eagle.
By the mid to late ’80s, the whole balance of Cold War strategy and technology began to shift yet again. Up until the ’70s, I would hazard a guess that barring an all out nuclear exchange, Russia stood a pretty good chance of winning a conventional war in Europe. Its expertise in tank warfare was nearly unmatched and its training, strategy and equipment were very good. America held a regular exercise called Reforger, or Redeploy for Germany, whose mission was to train US troops in rapidly deploying to meet a Russian strike. This must have been an incredibly dangerous task– the Americans had to cross an ocean patrolled by Russian submarines and airplanes, and upon arriving would be facing wave after wave of tanks.
In the ’70s, American commanders were eager to look away from Vietnam and counterinsurgency, and they decided to focus on a European war. What they found was not reassuring– contrary to the belief that Russians were stereotypical and scripted in behavior, they found that Russians had a frighteningly well-thought out operational theory and their equipment was well suited to the role. American qualitative advantage was not that high either– in tanks, it was perhaps even at best, and in air power, Vietnam showed how elderly MiG-17s could shoot down advanced F-4s.
Two things came to NATO’s rescue. First, they developed an actual, established doctrine of mobile warfare that also happened to integrate air operations to a far greater degree than Deep Operations did. This became the AirLand Battle doctrine that stressed speed, mobility, and initiative. In other words, it was a mirror image of Russian Deep Operations.
The second was the solid-state revolution. By the ’80s, the American lead in solid state technology became nearly insurmountable. Microchips made American weapons– from aircraft to tanks– incredibly “smart.” Computers, composite material technology, and other scientific discoveries were also being brought to bear ever more successfully. American weapons became incredibly sophisticated. Take for instance the F-16.
The F-16 was one of the first aircraft to use fly by wire technology, and it was also a “relaxed stability” design. Basically, an F-16 is intentionally “unstable” in flight, and will crash without constant computer intervention which automatically trim the airplane’s control surfaces. The result is a highly agile airplane– since it isn’t designed to fly “stable” it can change direction more readily than an aircraft that “naturally” reverts back to level flight. American advantages in digital technology meant the F-16 was also multi-role, with advanced sensors that enabled it to drop bombs accurately and fire missiles. The American lead in radar technology and electronic warfare became very great.
NATO also finally began paying attention to tanks and what emerged was a generation of Western tanks that became game changers. These vehicles were extremely well-protected, whether with advanced composite armor or with spaced armor, had fire control systems that let them fire accurately on the move, had advanced night vision, were fast and mobile, had excellent communications and were ergonomic. These were the M-1, the Challenger and the Leopard II. These tanks also promised to overthrow the traditional lead Russia had in armored warfare.
This combination of new doctrine, better training and better weapons made the ’80s a critical time for Russia. While it had finally achieved nuclear parity, the irony was that the risk of conventional war became greater. Because both sides now faced nuclear destruction, the odds of a war staying purely non-nuclear were higher, and in this field Russia was losing its lead. Robert O’Connell and other Cold War warfare historians have even theorized that this technological imbalance helped topple Russia, since Russia felt it had to respond in kind– through both technology and numbers, and this “broke the bank.”
I would hesitate to argue that Russian weapons and strategy fell behind greatly enough for NATO to guarantee a win. Russian strategy and military readiness did drop, it is true. Economic woes, political turmoil and internal problems meant that the Russian army of Glasnost and Perestroika was probably less operationally ready than the Russian army of the ’60s. Performance in Afghanistan and later in Chechnya are indicative of the Russian Army’s decline. However, Russia still had a rich history of military science to draw on and its equipment was still good. Rather ironically, Russia actually began to match American quality in the late ’80s. Russian aircraft like the MiG-29 Fulcrum and the Su-27 Flanker were extremely good, and nowadays, an upgraded Su-27 (the Su-33) is almost the benchmark of fighter performance.
An Su-27 demonstrating a high alpha maneuver. Possibly even the famous Pugachev Cobra?
What this means is that to the very end, the result of an East-West conventional showdown was still in doubt. Fundamentally, despite improvements from either party the balance stayed much the same as well: Russia was (and is) a tank power and American power is still predominantly based on its air force. This has continued to influence operations today. Whenever Russia intervened in recent history, it still relied on tanks– sometimes imprudently, like in Grozny– but sometimes with more success, like the recent Ossetian War. America still relies on its air power to project its strength, with the ongoing Libyan intervention being an excellent example.
Another legacy is that Cold War weaponry and tactics still dominate military thinking. America still uses Cold War era fighters, and even its next-generation aircraft, the F-22 and F-35 are largely designed to meet Cold War threats, like a Soviet-style air defense network. I’ve heard it argued enough times that it makes little sense to build $150 million F-22s to fight insurgents with $100 AK-47s– why not deploy cheaper aircraft like turboprop powered OV-10 Broncos for a fraction of the price and probably with more efficiency?
Russia is not immune to this Cold War hangover. To make its weapons more attractive to the world market, it has tried (and succeeded in many cases) to match Western developments. Its air defense systems are still some of the best in the world. America has seemingly given up on SAMs and AAA vehicles, feeling secure enough to abort the half-hearted M-247 Sgt York or to even retire the M-6 Linebacker, but Russia continues to develop SAMs. It also continues to sell them to anybody willing to pay.
Other countries who cannot match Russian or American Cold War-style military power often try to get around the problem by not fighting in the “conventional manner.” Signal successes have been achieved in this way by groups like the Viet Cong, the Chechnyan guerrillas, or even the IRA.
However, such is the influence of Cold War weaponry and military thinking that “conventional” military power is still the benchmark of military strength. Up and coming countries like China and India feel a need to match the Cold War arsenals of Russia and America in order to be taken seriously as powers. This ought to be especially remarkable given that China was a pioneer of Cold War guerrilla warfare. China has largely abandoned this style of warfare in an effort to emulate NATO and Russia.
So despite the fact that these Russian tanks and American aircraft never actually fought in the war for which they designed– their legacy lives on today.
Posted by callitaweasel 
