ASEAN: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It’s emblem is 10 sheaves of rice tied together to show solidarity. Southeast Asia has been looming large in American foreign policy recently– Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been traveling to the area, visiting places like the Philippines and Myanmar. The Americans have also rather firmly sided with the Philippines in the current imbroglio with China over the Spratleys. Southeast Asia occupies an extremely important part of the world’s strategic and economic considerations (don’t forget, people, that Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country and it also has very extensive energy deposits). However, as is typical, most people– Americans, Europeans, or even the Southeast Asians themselves– don’t know much about the region as a whole.
The term Southeast Asia is itself very recent. In World War II, the Allies needed to create administrative and strategic spheres in order to better prosecute the conflict. East Asia was the China theater, South Asia was India, and it was decided that the odd assortment of countries not part of either area would be given the rather unwieldy term of Southeast Asia. This was simply was strategic-speak for “not India and China.” Up to that point, the region as a whole had never really been given a name: the spice-producing areas of modern-day Malaysia and Indonesia were the “Indies,” Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia were “Indochina” and the Philippines tended to be the odd man out.
These terms, along with “Southeast Asia,” were Western terms– given to the region by European academics, government officials or military planners, and they illustrate rather neatly how the outside world tended to understand the region. The grand old civilizations of China and India dominated Western thinking, and there was always an assumption that Southeast Asia was simply an extension of these two great civilizations: a peripheral region that absorbed their cultures and ideas and was largely dominated by them. It also goes back to the Western notion that “Asians” are the “Other” ala Edward Said, that there is something similar about them.
This is the Russian baritone Dmitri Hvorostovsky. He was born in Siberia and could be geographically described as being "Asian."
The Southeast Asians themselves eventually embraced this inclusive term “Southeast Asia” during the Cold War. This was done for political and strategic reasons– the Southeast Asian nations wanted to separate themselves from India and China. The region tended to be aligned to America and NATO, and the regimes in power in Southeast Asia were wary of the non-aligned India or communist China. Vietnam is the obvious exception here, although post-Cold War, Vietnam has very closely aligned itself with ASEAN in order to put some distance between it and its traditional rival and enemy, China.
If it comes down to it, ASEAN may seem primarily like a geo-political grouping and nothing more. The member nations came together out of self-interest and strategic concerns, but not much else. There does not seem to be much regional solidarity. Essentially, Southeast Asia is a very heterogeneous area whose member nations seem to have very little in common.
Just prior to the ASEAN era, the region was never particularly cohesive in large part because it was divided up into colonial domains– European powers like Britain, France, Portugal, Spain and Holland had divvied up Southeast Asia. And as anybody who has read up on colonial economics and the dependency theory will know, the European colonial powers redirected the political and economic attentions of their colonies towards the metropole. The Philippines, for instance, had very little to do with other Southeast Asian societies during the Spanish era– when the Philippine finally ceased being nothing more than a transshipment point for Chinese goods, most of its trade and local produce was directed towards Spain.
When it comes to languages, it seems as if Southeast Asia is a Tower of Babel– the Philippines alone has almost 200 languages (not just dialects, mind), and other Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia and Indonesia are in the same boat.
It’s almost worse when it comes to major religions– Southeast Asia is home to sizeable populations of practically every major world religion, from Christianity, to Islam, to Buddhism and Hinduism. The only religion missing is Judaism.
“Southeast Asia” is therefore not like “Europe,” whose member nations can often claim great similarities or shared experiences. The label of “Southeast Asian” is also less consciously embraced by the people living in it, again unlike “European” which is often proudly used as a means of self-identification (especially when contrasting “Europe” to other areas). I know from experience that Filipinos know very, very little about other Southeast Asians. Filipinos are more likely to turn to America or Japan or China for their movies, music and TV than they are to other Southeast Asians. Little to nothing is taught in Philippine schools about Southeast Asia. I mean, how many Filipinos know who the current monarch of Thailand is or who the current prime minister of Malaysia is? Conversely, how many Thai or Malaysians know much about the Philippines? Is Manny Pacquiao a regional hero, or is he unknown elsewhere in Southeast Asia?
The question therefore is: does “Southeast Asia” have some sort of existence beyond strategic, economic or political considerations? Is there something that unites the countries of Southeast Asia beyond mutual interests?
This is where history and related academic fields like anthropology might be able to help. Perhaps a Southeast Asian identity can be found in the past, or in ethnography or linguistics?
Indeed, one point of commonality might very well be ethno-linguistic. This is the Austronesian connection. Wait, Austrowhat?
Austronesian?
Austronesian, mate?
The Austronesian peoples are an ethnic grouping– I hesitate to use the word “race”– that comprise much of island Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines). The Austronesians are probably what you can call the “Malays” or that racial or ethnographic classification so beloved by colonial era-European administrators and ethnographers. Filipinos might remember Otley Beyer in this respect.
Austronesian! Much better.
Austronesians have similarities in language. This link– http://www.zompist.com/anes.htm — shows the words for numbers in most Austronesian languages. So, for instance, in Tagalog the word for the number three is “tatlo” and in (randomly selected) Macassarese (from the Sulawesi) it is “tallu.”
There is also a similarity in culture. Perhaps the most interesting is the idea of the “Big Man” or the ruler who secures his or her authority not through institutional means like law, or strictly through use of force, but through persuasion, charisma and example. This is partly a result of geography– the Austronesian peoples tended to live in places where it is easy to decamp or flee from onerous or repressive rulers and eke out a living elsewhere– so being cruel or repressive didn’t always work. The “Big Man” theory was first observed in the ’50s and ’60s by anthropologists and to the best of my knowledge the similar phenomenon was not described in Southeast Asia until the ’70s. In the ’80s or so, Oliver Wolters described the mandala style of politics in Southeast Asia, where rulers also relied on charisma and persuasion. Again, to the best of my knowledge, no links between the “Big Man” and the mandala were made until much later, but then the “Austronesian” theory wasn’t very well known until recently.
To add to that, Austronesians believe in magical power– they believe that individuals have the ability to manipulate the natural world, the spirit world or other humans because of innate spiritual strength. However, as per Benedict Anderson, Austronesian cultures tend to believe that this power is limited– there is a reservoir of it in the world or in individuals that can either be drained or leeched away by others, or enhanced by magical items like talismans, weapons or amulets, or by spiritual exercises akin to meditation, berserkergang or yoga. This magical power is called mana in the Pacific, but has different names (if it has one) in Southeast Asia. My advisor F. Aguilar used the Ilonggo word dungan.
So yes, fantasy and video games owe the concept of "mana" or usable magic points, to the Austronesian peoples.
There is a major problem with the idea that Austronesian = Southeast Asian, however. First, Austronesians are found all over the Pacific and Indian Ocean area, not just in Southeast Asia. As I related above, Pacific Islanders are Austronesian, as are people from Madagascar (yes, not all Africans are “black”). Indeed, that picture of the Austronesian I showed above? He is Andry Rajoelina, head of state of Madagascar and not a recent immigrant or the child of immigrants. He is a native of Madagascar, as are many others like him.
Secondly, not all Southeast Asians are technically Austronesians. Peninsular Southeast Asia– Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are not peopled by a majority of Austronesians. There is a theory that some Peninsular Southeast Asians speak a form of Austronesian– Tai-Caday– and so may be distantly related to the Austronesians of Island Southeast Asia, but it is still just a theory. It also means Vietnam cannot be considered Southeast Asian, since the majority of Vietnamese are not at all Austronesian or speak a language related to the Austronesian languages.
This is why I hesitate to use “racial” groupings for Southeast Asia. What might be more accurate is that despite the fact that the Thai and other Peninsular Southeast Asians might not be Austronesians, they share very many cultural traits with their Malaysian, Indonesian or Filipino neighbors.
Take architecture:
Traditional Thai house
Recreation of the palace in Malacca
Note the similarities– the high peaked roofs, the organic, curved curlycue decorations, the stilts, and so on. A lot of these similarities are imposed by physical or topographical conditions– wood as a commonly used building material because of its abundance, the stilts because of flooding, and the high peaked roof to help with the heat. The decorations, the internal layouts and others are more cultural, however. For instance, Southeast Asians tended to sit on the floor and did not have a lot of furniture. Either way, a similarity is a similarity.
There are other important cultural and societal similarities. Southeast Asian conceptions of power prior to colonialism tended to be the same: that it was fluid, based on charisma and that borders were frontiers, not hard lines on a geopolitical map. Again, this is Oliver Wolter’s mandala, a concept that has become orthodoxy in Southeast Asian studies. Southeast Asia has had “kingdoms” or “empires” like the Srivijaya or the Sukhothai, but they were very different from “traditional” notions of empire (no Witfogellian hydraulic despotisms here). Benedict Anderson described it best– the political map of Southeast Asia more closely resembles a series of circles, where a polity’s power is strongest near the center, but fades with distance until it can blur and overlap with the circle of power or influence of another polity. And instead of relying strictly on coercion (through armies) or even through codified law or religious mandate to sustain authority, almost all Southeast Asian rulers relied on “continuous achievement.” The result is a “theatre state” ala Clifford Geertz. Rulers acted like rulers– they displayed their wealth, they displayed their military prowess, they disbursed gifts and held feasts, they arbitrated in disputes and they interceded with the spirit world (be they Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu or pagan rulers). This made Southeast Asian rulers “attractive” to current and potential followers, who pledged allegiance with the ruler who could best protect them or meet their material wants and needs.
What is amazing about this mode of power and politics is that it transcended even the religious diversity of Southeast Asia. Despite the variety of religions in the area, Muslims and Hindus and even Catholics still use charisma, still use spiritual power and all that when in rule– arguably, even today. Suharto, Sukarno, the Sultan of Brunei, Marcos, Mahatir, the Thai monarchs and a host of others all made use of charisma and displays of prowess (like oratory) to win over their people.
Almost all Southeast Asians, Austronesian or not, also believe in the existence of the spiritual power I mentioned above– in mana or dungan. For instance, Southeast Asian modes of combat heavily reflect this belief that spiritual power is a deciding factor in human affairs. This often manifests itself in showy, dextrous martial arts and in weapons that are as much for display as for combat. The keris, or kris, is remarkably widespread in Southeast Asia– it is a weapon imbued with spiritual significance. Elephants were also popular in Southeast Asian warfare because they were large and imposing– visible proof of a ruler’s spiritual power. There is a widespread Southeast Asian similarity in martial arts. The art called silat, is widespread throughout Southeast Asia. There is also a remarkable consistency of two-weapon fighting in Southeast Asia.
Aside from spiritual power, there is also a diffusion and commonality in the arts. I already showed similarities in architecture, but other Southeast Asian arts also seem to have common traits. Note these dancers:
From Thailand
From Malaysia
From Bali
And from Myanmar
These dancers will very often be dancing to the sound of gongs– a distinctly Southeast Asian form of music. In the Philippines they are known as kulintang, but a form of gong-instrument ensemble can be found all over the region: in Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia and, of course, the Philippines.
So whether from a similarity of geographic circumstance, or because of cross-cultural contact, Southeast Asian societies do have very real commonalities in culture and society. It therefore might be possible to speak of a Southeast Asian identity, one that– as the name implies– is not simply derivative of the Indian or Chinese.
A historiographical irony: in the early days of Southeast Asian studies, the Philippines was often left out of Southeast Asia. Because of Hispanization, some early Southeast Asian scholars tended to group the Philippines with Latin America! It is ironic because nowadays, I would actually be more inclined to leave Vietnam out of Southeast Asia– the one Southeast Asian country Americans really are aware of or studied. Vietnam’s politics, ethnic make-up, language and military systems owed much, much more to East Asia than it did to even their Thai neighbors.
ASEAN is nowadays criticized for being ineffectual, a kind of gentleman’s club where a lot of talking is done but little accomplished. In recent decades, Southeast Asian countries are more likely to be competitors than a community. Economically, for instance, there is often competition since many Southeast Asian countries have export-dependent economies. There have also been political or strategic conflicts– the konfrontasi that involved primarily Malaysia and Indonesia, but even saw the Philippines joining in at one point. Of course there is the conflict over the Spratleys.
So despite the very real cultural commonalities that Southeast Asians share, there is a distinct lack of unity in the region. It’s been slowly getting better– ASEAN has been slowly fumbling towards a greater degree of cohesion, but it’s slow work. There would be great advantages to the member nations if ASEAN really did try to band together and create a much more coherent economic and diplomatic zone than exists now– although the current problems that the Eurozone is experiencing might give people pause. Certainly it would help in competing with China. China is notoriously averse to any kind of regional alliance or partnership in which it isn’t involved. I mean, this is the country that is propping up North Korea in large part because it doesn’t want a unified Korea as a neighbor. It has courted ASEAN recently, trying to get itself involved in that association. In the Spratleys debate, China has attempted to divide the Southeast Asian claimants by making individual deals with them, preventing a round table agreement.
There would be precedents for greater ASEAN-member nation contacts. Nowadays, the Philippines main trading partners are not Southeast Asian nations, and neither are its main diplomatic and military ties are Southeast Asian. However, once upon a time the Philippines was very closely entwined in the trade and strategic networks of island Southeast Asia. Filipinos might find it interesting to know that one of the datu of Manila was a junior member of the Bruneian royal family. Magellan’s slave-interpreter Enrique was not a Filipino (he was from Malacca) but he could easily understand the Visayans he met– implying either a widespread trade language or lingua franca or just simply a similarity of languages. When Legazpi came to the Philippines in the 1560s, he encountered numerous trade ships from what would now be Malaysia and Indonesia. Indeed, the Philippines contact with China– so often played up in the popular historiography– was limited largely to the port of Manila and the greater bulk of Philippine trade relations was likely with other Southeast Asian polities.
We shouldn’t idealize pre-colonial Southeast Asia as some kind of cooperative heaven, however. Indeed, the very nature of the mandala system led to great competition, violent or otherwise, and places we now call “Malaysia” or the “Philippines” were actually patchworks of small polities who fought, competed and entered into shifting alliances. This disunity was what facilitated outside conquest throughout Southeast Asian history– there was always someone willing to help the Europeans or Japanese or whoever. There was always a polity willing to provide crucial logistical support or manpower that enabled outsiders to establish themselves in the region.
"If you build it, they will come."
In the end, it does seem as if “Southeast Asia” can indeed be thought of as more than just a convenient geo-political label. Perhaps there are enough commonalities among the current inhabitants of “Southeast Asia” that you could create an identity around which the people can rally.
But basically, like all geopolitical labels, “Southeast Asia” is as much an aspiration as it is a “reality.” There are indeed common cultural traits among the various Southeast Asian societies, but there are also a lot of very real cultural differences. The label “Southeast Asian” is as also an epistemological label, a way of organizing and thinking that, depending on the historian, might be convincing or not. Historians like the theory of the mandala and spiritual power, therefore they tend to explain history and pick facts that support these theories. But like all theories, it is highly likely that they will be superseded. Maybe one day, future historians will look back at Oliver Wolters and Benedict Anderson and think they had the dumbest ideas in the world–what were those old farts thinking? They grossly misrepresented Southeast Asia!
It will be interesting to see what will happen to Southeast Asia in the future. Will ASEAN succeed in creating a Southeast Asian sphere? Will the member nations go their separate ways? Either way, it’d be interesting– and as in the Age of Exploration, I can bet that the area will once again be of great interest to outsiders as a nexus of trade, diplomatic contact and cultural interaction.
